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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse the role that Social Security wealth and incentives play in the 
transition to retirement in Spain. We use the labour records and other relevant information 
contained in a newly released database [Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (2006)] 
to construct incentive measures stemming from the Social Security provisions in relation to 
retiring at old age and investigate the role played by such incentives and by other 
socio-economic variables on the retirement hazard. We compute the effects of the reform 
that took place in 2002, which made the requirements to access a pension stricter in 
general. We carry out a dynamic reduced-form analysis of the retirement decision using a 
duration model. 
Our results show that both the pension wealth and substitution effects have a 
significant role on retirement decisions, but that the latter has less relevance since the reform 
introduced in 2002. 
 
Keywords: older workers employment, retirement, public pensions. 
JEL Classification: J14, J26. 
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1 Introduction 
The rise of pension expenditure is a matter of concern in ageing economies, such as Spain, 
as social security systems were designed at a time when demographic structures were 
characterised by a much lower life expectancy and a much higher fecundity1. Therefore, both, 
the number of retired people and the retirement period were much lower when the system 
was launched than nowadays2. 
On top of such demographic developments, we observed, up to the early nineties, a 
decline in the labour force participation of older workers, which has recovered since, attaining 
the levels reached in the late eighties. The combination of both factors has lead to the 
prediction that the ratio between people in working age and people of 70 or more years 
of age, which is nowadays around 5.5 in Spain, will be only 2.25 in 2055. So, a smaller 
proportion of people will be providing the revenue that will be transferred to older people in 
the form of pensions. In this sense, the behaviour of older workers is contributing to the 
increase in pension expenditures. 
The role of pension benefit rules in relation to labour market participation of the 
elderly is regarded as central in many countries, as they may create incentives to retire early 
from work. In this sense, three issues are relevant here: the amount of the pension that 
the system provides, the pattern of benefits associated with each age of retirement and the 
entitlement rights that define the conditions to be met to be able to claim a pension at each 
age. Parametric changes for the Social Security system have been and are being discussed in 
Spain under the so-called Toledo Agreement while some countries have already implemented 
large reforms. Many changes have been directed to reducing incentives to early retirement 
embedded in the pension system and to increase incentives to leave the labour market at a 
later age. Governments have also promoted active labour force measures that should 
stimulate the demand for elderly workers, thus contributing to raising or maintaining labour 
market participation of the elderly. 
The goal of this paper is to study and quantify the role that Social Security 
provisions for old-age pensions are playing on the retirement decision of the elderly in 
Spain. We propose estimating a reduced form model for retirement to capture the 
effects of pension incentives on pension claiming, controlling for some socio-demographic 
characteristics. In particular, we analyse the probability of retiring at a given age, given that 
the person has not retired yet, as a function of individual variables. 
Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004) have carried out an analysis of similar characteristics, 
estimating the probability of retiring at a given date. The objective of the work that we are 
presenting here is to widen such study in three main directions. On the first place, 
we propose estimating a duration model and not a point in time estimation, so as to allow a 
consideration of the determinants of the retirement decision at different ages, and, particularly 
                                                                          
1. It is the decline in fecundity, more than the longevity increase, what explains the forecast that more than 30% of total 
Spanish population will be older than 65 years of age in the middle of this century. 
2. In fact, the average number of years that a man aged 65 was expected to live from that age was around 12 in the 
middle of the 20th century, it has grown up to 15 now, and is forecasted to increase to 20 years in the middle of 
this century, according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). 
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to assess the role of the SS incentives for early retirement and for retirement at each age3. 
Moreover, we use a new database, the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), which 
has recently been released to explore this issue further. The advantage of the MCVL for the 
analysis in relation to previous samples obtained from the same source, and used in empirical 
work4, is that the sample design is known and, therefore, it allows for a better and 
broader understanding of the results obtained. A duration approach seems to maximize 
the informative content of this database, as it allows following the workers’ decisions across 
time. Finally, we address the quantification of the impact of the change in pension rules 
whose full implementation took place in 2002. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly summarise the 
empirical results obtained so far on the determinants of retirement for old people in Spain. 
Section 3 contains a description of the dataset that we use in the analysis. In section 4 we 
discuss the empirical model that we estimate and whose results are summarised in section 5. 
Section 6 contains the conclusions. A data appendix is included, as well as an appendix 
containing the main features of the Spanish Social Security pension system. 
                                                                          
3. Villagarcía (1995) and Muñoz (1995) apply the duration model approach to analyse the age of retirement, using 
the EPA database, which is cross sectional by construction. Because of the data source they cannot address the 
role played by SS incentives. 
4. A previous version of a similar database with information up to 1995 and whose description can be found in 
Martínez (1999), has been used in Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004), Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2002), and 
Jimenez-Martín et al. (2000 and 2006). The main drawbacks of such database are that the detailed sample design 
has not been disclosed and that it is not publicly available. 
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2 The empirical analysis of the role of Social Security on retirement decisions 
The vast majority of empirical analysis carried out to measure the role of Social Security on 
retirement decisions has been done for the USA, while evidence for other countries, and 
specially Spain, is more limited5. 
One of the most revealing evidence of the dependency between withdrawal from 
labour force and pension regulations in Spain is the presence of spikes in the benefit claiming 
moment around the ages of 60, the earliest age a pension can be, in general, claimed, 
and 65, the ordinary retirement age. Such pattern is also observed in other western countries 
[Gruber and Wise (1999 and 2004)], where eligibility ages prescribed in country-specific 
provisions also play a major role in defining the observed pattern of retirement by age. 
The microeconomic evidence that has been gathered so far shows that the Spanish 
early retirement provisions play an important role in the modal age of retirement and 
its pattern in different ages [Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004)] and that, in general, labour 
force transitions of elderly men depend on Social Security regulations [Alba (1997), 
García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín (2008a and 2008b)]6, and their interdependence with 
health considerations Blanco (2000) and Prieto et al. (2002). 
There are few papers that attempt at quantifying the impact of pension Social 
security incentives on labour force participation. In particular, Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004) 
and Jiménez (2006) do so through changes in the social security framework. These works 
follow a regression-based approach, being based on reduced-form behavioural equations, to 
model the effect on the decision to retire of pension wealth, the incentives embedded 
in the pension system and individual demographic characteristics. Estimating retirement 
hazard rates, using a probit model on a sample of individual work histories randomly drawn 
from the historical files of Social Security affiliates, they conclude that a substantial portion of 
the retirement behaviour cannot be explained by Social Security factors. On the other hand, 
García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín (2008b) find evidence of the relevance of the social security 
incentives on the transitions from unemployment for older workers. Using a sample of 
individuals aged between 56 and 70 from the European Union Household Panel (PHOGUE), 
wave 7 (2000), Utrilla de la Hoz and Ubago (2005) find that a replacement rate (pension over 
total income) below 80% reduces the probability of retiring. 
The effect of the successive pension reforms has been empirically addressed 
and point out, in general, to its effectiveness in lowering retirement. Jiménez (2006) carries out 
a simulation exercise that computes the effect of the Spanish old age pension reforms that 
took place in 1997 and 2002 and concludes that they reduce the hazard rates. A similar 
qualitative result is found in Gutiérrez-Domenech (2006), where, using a longitudinal survey of 
Catalan population, it is shown that the 2002 reform contributed to the increase in the 
staying-on employed probabilities of the individuals older than 60. On the other hand, 
Sánchez-Martin (2005), using a calibrated overlapping- generations model finds that the 
                                                                          
5. This literature has been reviewed in detail in Diamond and Gruber (1999) and Coile and Gruber (2000). Evidence 
for other countries can be found in Gruber and Wise (1999 and 2004), where also the case of Spain is addressed 
[Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004)]. 
6. See García Pérez and Sánchez Martín (2008a and 2008b) for some results on the links between unemployment, 
retirement and their associated public insurance programmes calibrated with data from the MCVL. 
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overall effect of the 2002 reform is a clear drop in the average retirement age, as younger 
cohorts of low income workers benefit from the opportunity of leaving the labour force early. 
As for the impact of truncations in the system, Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez 
(2000 and 2006) show, through the estimation of the behavioural parameters of a structural 
model, that the existence of minimum pension’s regulations has an impact on early retirement 
decisions. They find that the combination of age penalties and minimum pensions generate 
large incentives to early retirement for those workers with low wages and short labour 
histories. Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2006) conclude that there is a threefold increase 
in retirement at 60 with respect to the economy without minimum pensions and that total 
early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger. 
Finally, there is the line of research devoted to analysing the sustainability of the 
pension system which is usually formulated within the framework of an overlapping 
generations model. The evidence gathered on the effects of delaying the normal retirement 
age a number of given years [Sánchez-Martín (2003); Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2003); 
Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2008)] shows that this strategy has an important impact 
on the system deficit. 
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3 The Data  
3.1 The MCVL 
The database Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL 2006) includes all the 
electronically recorded information that the Social Security administration keeps in relation 
to labour and contributory pension history for more than one million of individuals, whose 
anonymity is preserved. It is a 4% random draw from a reference population, which is 
composed of all the people who at any time during 2006 had a registered record with the 
Social Security system, either because they were contributing or because they were receiving 
a pension. Therefore, it does include those that were unemployed for the whole 2006, either if 
they received a contributory pension or if they received unemployment benefits, as in the 
latter case, the National Employment Service pays their social contributions to the Social 
Security Funds. The sample does not contain any information relating to the scheme called 
the Regimen de Clases Pasivas that covers public sector employment, so that most civil 
servants cannot be included in the analysis. It must be pointed out that as a consequence of 
the definition of the reference population a large proportion of non-working females is also 
included, mostly as preceptors of a widowhood pension7. 
Most of the labour, contributory and pension history of the over one million 
individuals has been recovered, so that their employment history can be reconstructed. 
The data contain, for each employment spell, information on covered earnings, which are the 
amount of the earnings that the Social Security regulations takes into account for 
the computation of pension rights. Covered earnings can be regarded as a good proxy 
for actual earnings, although they have both a ceiling and a floor: on the one hand, a 
minimum contribution must be paid over earnings, independently of the actual amount 
perceived, so that there is a minimum covered earning associated to it; on the other hand, 
earnings above a given ceiling do not pay contributions and therefore do not generate further 
rights. Covered earnings are used in the empirical analysis to proxy the wage variable. 
Moreover, for each employment spell we have also information on length and type of 
contract, the Social Security regime and contributive group that are associated with the job 
and that define the amount of the contributions and the conditions to access the pensions, 
as well as information about the firm, such as its activity sector and location (province)8. 
Available data also include some personal characteristics such as sex, age, place and year of 
birth. We can also know the place where the worker first affiliated, which could be regarded 
as the place where the first job was taken. Data on people’s socio characteristics, such as 
marital status are poorly recorded in the sense that the available information corresponds 
to the situation when the affiliation took place, and in no case there is any reference to the 
spouse’s working status, so that it is not possible to take into account the joint 
decision to retire9. As far as social transfers are concerned, the database contains information 
on periods and amounts enjoyed for old-age and disability pensions or survivors’ pensions 
                                                                          
7. A detailed description of the sample can be found at Seguridad Social (2006), and an overview in Argimón and 
González (2006). 
8. Active policy measures to promote retaining or offering a job to old people cannot be taken into account as the 
dataset does not include enough information to do so. 
9. The MCVL has been matched with information coming from the Census. In the Census’ module “Co-inhabitants” 
there is information about the number of people living with the person in the MCVL dataset, their age and sex, 
but not their working status. 
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such as, orphanage, widowhood and family help. There is no data on other sources of 
individual wealth or other sources of income10. 
3.2 The subsample 
Given that we are only interested in retirement decisions taken by the elderly, we restrict our 
initial sample from the 2006 wave to people that are aged between 60 and 70 in 2006 
(i.e. those born between 1936 and 1946) and that have already become entitled to a pension 
benefit, defined in terms of being able to prove at least 15 contributory years. It means that 
we exclude those for which the Social Security system does not record any contributory life, 
those that have retired before their 60th birthday11 and those who started receiving an old age 
pension before 1997, when a large pension reform was introduced12. We have also excluded 
those that receive an old-age pension coming from incapacity, as the determinants to claim 
such kind of pension are most likely linked to health factors, which are not comparable with 
the rest of the determinants13. We additionally restrict the sample to men as the labour 
history of women is quite different from the one for males, so that the determinants of their 
decisions may be rather different. Finally, to ensure homogeneity in pension rules, the sample 
is limited to those whose longest recorded labour relation has taken place in the General 
Regime, the Social Security scheme that gathers the largest proportion of workers14. 
Finally, we also exclude some individuals with incomplete recorded contributory 
information so that the sub-sample we use for the analysis is composed of 35,853 men, 
whose distribution by year of birth and retirement age is reflected in Table 1. 
                                                                          
10. The MCVL has also been matched to Personal Income Tax data corresponding to one fiscal year. In that sense, 
information on additional sources of income could be obtained, but not in a longitudinal dimension. 
11. Early retirement before the age of 60 is only possible for dangerous and unhealthy jobs such as air pilots, some 
miners, railways workers, bullfighters and artists. 
12. Very few records relating to pensions awarded before 1997 are available. 
13. Moreover, the transition to the old-age retirement scheme is deterministic, so that disability pensions are converted 
into retirement pensions once the beneficiaries turn 65 years of age. These pensions receive a very favourable 
tax treatment. 
14. See the Appendix on legislation for a description of the regulatory framework. 
Born Not retired Total
60 61 62 63 64 65
1936 205 199 152 295 892 189 1,932
1937 880 201 162 149 295 866 195 2,748
1938 817 136 159 153 285 819 170 2,539
1939 652 103 135 134 243 732 190 2,189
1940 948 168 225 232 401 1,225 314 3,513
1941 704 140 187 192 332 981 893 3,429
1942 607 186 170 188 350 1,956 3,457
1943 600 213 231 205 2,671 3,920
1944 554 200 220 2,963 3,937
1945 546 209 3,449 4,204
1946 388 3,597 3,985
Total 6,696 1,761 1,688 1,405 2,201 5,515 16,587 35,853
Table 1
Distribution by year of birth and retirement age. Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946 
having worked in the General Regimen and with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
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4 Empirical framework 
The earliest empirical work in this area considered reduced-form models of the retirement 
decision as a function of Social Security wealth and pension level. While the estimation 
strategies employed differed, depending mainly on the nature of available data, the results 
consistently suggested a role for Social Security. The main limitation of this type of studies is 
that they consider Social Security effects at a point in time, but cannot account for the impact 
on retirement decisions arising from the time pattern of social security wealth accruals. 
In order to address this shortcoming, different approaches were followed in subsequent 
analysis. The accrual of Social Security or other more forward-looking incentive measures 
were developed and their effect was analysed with the estimation of reduced-form models15. 
Alternatively, a different approach was to consider structural models where workers were 
facing a budget constraint which was discontinuous or kinked16. Another line of research is 
the “option value” model of retirement where it is postulated that not only the level of 
pension wealth or its increment with one additional year of work is a determinant of the 
retirement decision, but that what is relevant is the evolution of future wealth and work. 
So retirement decisions are modelled as a function of the difference between the utility of 
retirement at the current date and at the date that maximizes one’s utility [Stock and 
Wise (1990)]. In its structural form this model is difficult to implement, so numerous authors 
[Samwick (1998); Gruber and Wise (1999); Hakola (2002); Blundell et al. (2002)] have used 
the option value in reduced form models. More recently, applied general equilibrium models 
are also being used to explore the pensions issue [for instance, Imrohoroglu et al. 1999)] 
so that they need to be calibrated to be able to produce numerical results17. 
The paper follows the hazard model approach followed in Grubber and Wise (2004), 
and Blundell et al. (2002), among others, to capture the effects of changes in social 
security wealth and other variables on retirement. Although the option value model is the 
theoretically most intuitive model and the structural model should provide more insight 
into the issue, we choose the simplicity of this reduced form technique because of the 
computational complexity of the alternative approaches18. Moreover, it is partially forward 
looking, as it allows for continuous updating of information as individuals grow older. That is, 
for an individual who complies with the requirements to retire at age t, the probability of 
retiring at age t+1 is modelled in terms of the ratio of annual wage earnings over pension 
benefits, public pension accruals and labour situation at time t. The retirement decision is 
analysed in this paper following a duration model approach that treats it as a dynamic 
discrete choice19. 
We define T (our duration variable) as the period between the age the person 
becomes entitled to receive a retirement pension until the age that person claims the benefit. 
                                                                          
15. Spataro (2005) proposes a set of alternative measures that feature the forward-looking aspect and applies them to 
Italian data. 
16. The lifetime budget constraint is analogous to the standard labor-leisure budget constraint, with annual hours 
replaced by years of labour force participation, and annual earnings replaced by cumulative lifetime compensation. 
The kinks are produced by changes in the accrual rates (the rise in retirement income entitlement caused by continuing 
to work for one more year). See, for instance, Burtless (1986).  
17. See Jimeno et al. (2006) for a survey of the features of different approaches used in the literature to study the effects 
of population aging on Social Security expenditures. 
18. Moreover Spataro (2002) finds that a reduced-form model is preferable to the structural option value model. 
19. We assume that individuals will choose to remain with the current situation if the utility of remaining exceeds 
the utility of retiring 
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We treat it as a discrete variable, defined in years, that changes as time goes by20. We let iC  
be the maximum number of years that we could observe the individual in the sample, which 
only depends on his year of birth and the moment he became eligible, so that it is constant. 
So, that, for example, if a person born in 1941, becomes eligible in 2001 (when he is 60), and 
only claims a pension benefit in 2003 (when he is 62), will have in 2004, T=3 and C=5. In our 
estimation we restrict iC  to be at least 1 and no greater than 6 as we assume that the 
decision to retire only takes place between 60 and 66, as only very few people retire after that 
age, or do not retire at all. The dataset contains some individuals that either can only be 
observed before they take the decision of interest (i.e. claim pension benefit) because we only 
observe the individuals up to the year 2006 or either did not claim a retirement pension before 
the age of 66. In both cases, data is right censored. For these individuals we can only 
observe that T>C, so that they remain in the current situation for a larger number of years 
than the ones that the sample allows us to observe them. That is, we observe claiming at T 
only if T=<C. Otherwise, we observe that T>C. We assume that T is independent of C21. 
The intensity of transition to claiming or the hazard function (i.e. the probability of an 
individual retiring precisely at time t, given that he has not retired before t), is defined as: 
 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, some of which are age dependent and others 
are constant and independent of the age. It provides the probability of not claiming benefits 
for exactly t years relative to the group of individuals who have been not claiming for at least t 
years. In other words, it gives the probability of retiring T years after having become entitled to 
a pension, given that the person has not retired before. 
A discrete duration model can be regarded as a sequence of binary choice 
equations (with cross equation restrictions) defined on the survival population at each 
duration. 
We are, therefore, interested in the conditional distribution of T in relation to variables 
x:  ii x|tF  
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where   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
                                                                          
20. We must remind that not all individuals in the sample are either working or have claimed an old-pension. Some of 
them are unemployed and receive benefits, some do not receive benefits, but are also contributing and some do not 
contribute. Moreover, some go through different labour situations before claiming the pension. [See Argimón, González 
and Vegas (2007)]. The situation immediately preceding retirement is conditioned upon, but duration is defined 
independently of the situation. 
21. It must be reminded that for some cohorts we can only have observations of people retiring after a given age 
(60 for those born in 1936) or before a given age (for instance, at most at 60 for those born in 1946), in the latter case, 
given that this is the age when the sample was extracted, as shown in Table 1. 
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The dependent variable in the model is the probability of retiring (claiming a 
retirement pension) at a specific age, given that the person has become eligible to do so22 
and has not retired the preceding years23. The explanatory variables that have been included 
in the specification (Xi) can be grouped in three main categories: social security framework, 
personal characteristics, and labour characteristics. A detailed description of the variables 
that have been used can be found in Appendix 1. 
We build up the traditional measures of the incentive mechanisms that are standard 
in this literature. In particular, we use the Replacement Rate (RRt), which is the ratio of the 
expected pension benefits over wages, the Social Security Wealth (SSWt), that is, the present 
discounted value of the future stream of pension benefits, the Accrual Rate (SSAt ) which 
measures the discounted increase in SSW from postponing retirement one year and the Peak 
Value (PVt), that compares this year’s social security wealth to the maximum social security 
wealth that could be attained in the future. They are constructed under the assumptions 
that the age of death is certain, no changes in social security regulation are expected by 
individuals and it excludes any tax considerations. 
Table 2 provides information about the descriptive values of the incentive Social 
Security variables showing that, while the average stock of wealth was higher after the 2002 
reform than before, the incentives linked to it were lower. On the other hand, the RR 
increased after the reform. It also contains information related to working status, 
distinguishing between those observations corresponding to a working situation (l) previous 
to the decision moment and those corresponding to an unemployment situation (u). The rest 
of the observations correspond to either an already retired situation or another situation where 
there is no work involved.  Information concerning the rest of the variables can be found 
in Table A1 of the appendix. 
 
                                                                          
22. It could be the case that they withdrew the labour market much in advance and remained unemployed or were 
inactive for some time. In fact, in the case of Spain, early retirement regulation stipulates that in some cases, workers 
need to be unemployed to be able to claim retirement pensions before the age of 65, the ordinary retirement age. 
Moreover, up to 2002, pension regulations required total or substantial withdrawal from any form of employment 
requiring affiliation to the Social Security System to be able to perceive an old-age pension. In 2002, partial 
retirement was regulated, so that employment and old-age pensions could be simultaneously enjoyed, while the 
mandatory retirement age at 65 was effectively abolished (see Cairó (2007)). An alternative would be to study the 
transitions from employment to a non-employment status, as in Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006). 
23. So, for each person, the decision moment is different and is defined in relation to his day of birth, assuming that they 
are yearly decisions. 
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We make that both the level of social security wealth and the different incentive 
variables enter the equation. The level captures wealth effects: the larger the value of wealth, 
the larger the demand of all goods, including leisure, if leisure is a normal good. The incentive 
variables capture a substitution effect: the higher the price for leisure, the lower its demand, 
so that if there is a larger financial incentive to additional years of work, then individuals will 
retire later. The specification chosen also allows us to test whether the sole act of being 
entitled is a determinant for retirement, in the sense that the individual leaves his current 
situation as soon as he is entitled to collect a pension benefit. Finally, the impact of the 
regulatory change introduced from 2002 is also analysed, both as it could have affected 
the average probability of retiring and through its effects on the incentive mechanisms. 
As for the labour characteristics, the control variables include the individual’s 
labour situation the year preceding the decision date, distinguishing between working and 
unemployed, the activity sector and some measures of labour mobility or precariousness. 
Finally, we also include some standard demographic controls such as age, education 
and health status. We also control for the collection of other benefits as they may interact 
with the old age pension. Finally, regional dummy variables and GDP growth are also included 
to control for the macro environment. 
The duration dependence of the hazard rate is captured in two ways. On the one 
hand, following Bover et al. (2002) we do not impose a specific functional form for duration, 
so that we introduce additive dummy variables for each of the possible discrete values of the 
duration variable. Durations of more than 6 years (which would necessarily imply that 
the person is at least 66) are treated as censored at 6 years, due to the relatively small 
number of observations under such circumstance. On the other hand, interaction of certain 
independent variables with the duration are included to see if the variable effects change 
with the number of years that a person takes to retire. Table A1 in Appendix 1 contains the 
summary of the variables used. 
median mean s.d. median mean s.d. median mean s.d.
SSWt(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAt(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVt
(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRt(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lt-1(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
ut-1(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
N 115,532 40,123 75,409
n 35,853 16,212 28,259
N: Number of observations; n: people
(1) In thousands of euros
(2) In percentage
Table 2
 Descriptive values of Social Security incentives and working status. Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946, having 
worked in the General Regimen and with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
 All period considered 1996-2006 Before 2002 After 2002
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5 Results 
The qualitative impacts of the variables on the hazards are discussed in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, which are reported in detail in Table A2 in 
Appendix 1. We present in that Table three different specifications with two different sets of 
Social Security incentive variables. So, under model A we present the estimated coefficients 
obtained for the basic specification, distinguishing between the Accrual Rate (SSA) as 
incentive variable, and the Peak Value (PV). Model B tries to capture the impact of the 2002 
reform through the inclusion of dummy variables that test for its relevance and effect 
on the response to the social security variables, while model C, also include dummy variables 
that capture the effect on the retirement hazard rate of being entitled to perceive the minimum 
or the maximum pension benefit at each age. 
The size of the impacts of the Social Security measures on the probability of 
retiring is reported in Table 3. In particular, they are measured as the predicted effect of a 
change in the Social Security variable on the hazard, computing it as an elasticity, for the 
variables that are continuous. For the qualitative ones, its impact is computed from 
the change from 0 to 1 in the variable, so that they can be interpreted as the direct effect of 
having such characteristics on the probability of retiring. The more detailed quantitative 
impact of a change in all the variables included in the specification distinguishing by age is 
reported in Table A3 of Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSA PV SSA PV SSA PV 
SSWt 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
0.29 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33
SSAt -0.07 -0.04 -0.06
-0.03 -0.02 -0.02
PVt -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
-0.03 -0.01 -0.01
RRt 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
Results are obtained from the regressions presented in Table A2 where:
Model A represents the basic model. 
Model B represents Model A including changes in 2002 regulation as control variables.
Model C includes Model B and income level as control variables.
Median values are in italics
Table 3
(*)Quantitative effects are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 
10% increase in the variables' values with respect to the logistic function evaluated at the observed
variables' values. 
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C
Quantitative effects of Social Security measures on the retirement
probability (*)
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5.1 Economic incentives and regulation 
As the results in Table A2 show, all the social security variables coefficients –for SSW, SSA 
and PV- are statistically significant with the expected sign. Increases in the total present value 
of the flow of pensions that a person will receive from the year she retires to the year she dies, 
i.e. an increase in SSW, increases the hazard. Increases in the difference of this amount 
derived from postponing the retirement (either one or more years) reduce the hazard, whether 
SSA or PV are used to capture the substitution effect. 
In order to provide an assessment of the explanatory power of the different variables, 
whose statistical significance has been tested, for the hazard rate, we propose using the 
Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian Information criteria (BIC), as recorded in Table 4. By providing 
a criterion to choose among nested models, we can compare the relative explanatory 
power of the different variables to affect the probability of retiring. As shown, the pension 
wealth and the incentive measures are jointly significant (Table 4) for all specifications. 
On pure likelihood grounds, the specification that does include the peak value dominates 
the one with the more myopic incentive measure. 
 
In spite of these effects being statistically significant, their size is not very large. 
As the figures in Table 3 show, a 10% rise in SSW, increases on average around 7 
percentage points the probability of retiring between 60 and 65 years of age. Moreover, 
these probabilities show a U-shaped form with age (Table A3), reaching the highest impact 
at 65, so that the closer the person is to that age, the more responsive to changes in SSW 
she becomes. 
As for the incentive variables, we find that increasing by 10% the difference between 
what a worker would receive if she retired now and what she would receive if she retired one 
year later (increasing SSA) decreases the average probability of retiring between 60 and 65 
by between 0.3 and 0.7 pp and by a similar amount if the 10% increase would be in PV. 
The effects on the retirement probability of the SSA and PV incentives are also U-shaped in 
Contribution of AIC BIC AIC BIC
Overall Model C 65659.72 66210.18 -32772.86 (57) 65648.87 66199.34 -32767.44 (57)
SSWt 66186.56 66717.71 -33038.28 (55) 66164.28 66695.43 -33027.14 (55)
SSAt 65694.62 66225.77 -32792.31 (55) 65694.62 66225.77 -32792.31 (55)
RRt 65659.82 66190.97 -32774.91 (55) 65656.79 66187.94 -32773.39 (55)
SSWt and SSAt 66212.33 66724.17 -33053.17 (53) 66212.33 66724.17 -33053.17 (53)
SSWt and RRt 66201.02 66712.86 -33047.51 (53) 66188.33 66700.17 -33041.17 (53)
SSAt and RRt 65703.37 66215.21 -32798.69 (53) 65703.37 66215.21 -32798.69 (53)
SSWt, SSAt and RRt 66226.46 66718.98 -33062.23 (51) 66226.46 66718.98 -33062.23 (51)
r2002 65787.63 66299.47 -32840.81 (53) 65792.13 66303.96 -32843.06 (53)
(*)Results are obtained from regressions under Model C of Table A 2. Degress of freedom in parenthesis. 
  Number of observations: 115,532.
Table 4
Relative incidence of Social Security measures on retirement decisions for all the period 
considered (*)
ln Likelihoodln Likelihood
PVSSA
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relation to age (Table A3), so that they are large at 60, decline then and later start 
increasing again. 
On the other hand, the replacement rate, does show the positive expected sign for 
the whole sample, but it is not statistically significant, a finding which is confirmed by the 
results on the AIC and the BIC criteria shown in Table 4. 
From the calculations presented in Table 4 we could conclude that the wealth 
variable plays a larger role on the determination of the hazard rate than any of the 
incentive variables. That could imply that changing the quantity that is transferred through 
pensions is more relevant to retirement decisions than changing the built-in incentives in 
the regulation. 
The observed probability of retiring between 60 and 65 before 2002 is higher than 
after 2002 and this relationship happens at every of the ages between 60 and 65 (Figure 1). 
The role of the 2002 reform on this change is tested with both the introduction of a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 from 2002 onwards and which may capture changes in tastes 
or other factors that are not channelled through the Social Security variables, and with the 
inclusion of this dummy variable interacted with the Social Security incentive and pension 
wealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we use the sign and the t-ratios of both the dummy and the interacted 
variables to test for significance of the changes that were introduced in 200224, we can 
conclude that the reform did not change the pattern of response to the wealth variable, 
but the response to the incentive variables, in general, reducing its impact on the timing of 
retirement (Table A 2). That is: we need a larger value of SSA (or PV) from 2002 to reach 
the same impact on the hazard, as shown in Table A 4, where a decomposition of the effects 
of the reform on the incidence of the different incentive variables is shown. This result could 
be explained as a consequence of the fact that one of the changes carried out under the 
reform improved the treatment for those that had more than 30 years of contribution, 
increasing for them the amount of the pension to be perceived at each age. The fact 
that most workers (64%) already had at least 30 contributory years (in particular, nearly a third 
had more than 34 years of contributions), may explain the finding that the reform reduced 
the incidence of the incentive structure. Additionally, the replacement rate becomes 
statistically significant for this period, so that a more myopic approach seems to result. 
Therefore, the observed reduction in the hazard rate does not seem to stem from the new 
                                                                          
24. See Norton et al. (2004) for a discussion of such test. 
Figure 1 Predicted hazard rates before and after 2002 by age
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regulation, which has reduced its incidence, but from a collection of other factors that are 
captured by the dummy. 
The evidence gathered shows that those individuals that are being low topped in terms 
of the amount of their Social Security wealth have a higher retirement probability at 60 than 
those that are not (Table A 4). It could be argued that the minimum pension mechanism blocks 
the effect of early retirement penalties so that it creates a strong incentive for low income 
earners to retire, that is specially strong at 60. From 61 onwards being low topped in wealth 
reduces the probability of retiring. In fact, the older the person, the higher is the reduction in the 
probability to retire. This result could be consistent with the idea that people might choose to 
carry on working in order to build up more pension rights, given the built-in incentives, arising 
from the higher dependency between the amount of the pension to be perceived and the latest 
wages that he receives compared to previous wages, wich, under the expectation that they 
increase with age, could lead to a larger pension in the future. 
The results also show that high earners (those that have their pensions capped) have 
a lower probability of retiring both at 64 and 6525 (Table A 4), in line with the findings in 
Villagarcía (1995), Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (1999), Blanco (2000) and Labeaga (2008) 
that show that income plays a positive role on continuing in employment. This finding could 
result from the fact that, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the 
marginal utility from working, A lower potential wage rate for a mature age worker is likely to 
be associated with a lower probability of labour force participation, as other things equal, 
a lower wage rate represents a lower opportunity cost of leisure and a higher replacement 
rate for government pensions. 
5.2 Duration variables and cycle 
Given that individuals enter the sample as soon as they satisfy the requirements to claim 
a pension, we can interpret the significance of the dummy coefficient for duration 1 (g1) as a 
test for the relevance of becoming entitled to access the retirement benefits26. We could 
expect that if the preference for retiring is high enough, becoming eligible would be a main 
determinant of the decision to retire, and people will retire as soon as the regulation would 
entitle them to. The regression results report a non statistically significant coefficient for g1 
(Table A 2), so that it can be said that the fact of becoming eligible by itself is not a relevant 
ground for retirement. The results show also a non-monotonic duration dependence. 
We will comment on the interrelation between duration and the effect of some of the 
covariates when we present the results for the latter. 
Early-retirement may result from fluctuations in the economic cycle. Our results show 
that the propensity to retire is pro-cyclical, so that the hazard retirement rate is higher during 
macroeconomic expansions, feature that has been observed in other studies about retirement 
decisions [Montizaan, Cörvers and de Grip (2007)]. A possible explanation of this result could 
be the fact that asset cycles are highly correlated with the evolution of the business cycle. 
If people rely on their investments to fund their consumption in retirement, besides what they 
can get from the retirement pension, they are particularly vulnerable to market downturns. 
That could be the reason why in periods of economic prosperity, prospective retirees 
are more optimistic about the evolution of their other sources of income and therefore 
                                                                          
25. People from all ages can be low topped, but only people that are 64 or older can receive the maximum pension. 
26. See the appendix for a description of these conditions. 
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decide to retire earlier. On the other hand, Muñoz (1995), pooling the EPA data, provides 
evidence that in a recession individuals retire earlier. 
 
5.3 Age 
In our specification, we also include age dummies to account for differential effects arising 
from age itself. These dummies should capture the effect of growing older “per se”, and not 
through the different coefficients in the calculation of pension rights that are age dependent.  
The results show that, even when controlling for eligibility criteria and Social security variables, 
65 is a prevailing retirement age. 
5.4 Working status, sector of activity and other labour history related variables 
The activity status prevailing during the year before the decision is taken could be relevant 
for the retirement hazard. In particular, the sample allows us to distinguish between four 
labour status: working, receiving unemployment benefits and thus also contributing 
to Social Security, contributing without working nor perceiving unemployment benefits 
(special agreement), and not contributing. 
The results show that a person working at a particular year has a lower probability 
of retiring the following year than a person who was not working, even when we condition on 
social security incentives. They also show that being unemployed the preceding year 
increases the probability of retiring. Such findings may only reflect the predominance 
of special early retirement programs that exist for unemployed old people27. We also find 
that the size of these effects varies with age, as can be seen in Figure 2, showing a 
u-shaped form. 
 
We also include as a covariate the activity sector, which allows us to distinguish 
between those working in the service sector and those working in the industry sector. 
The estimated coefficient is, however, not statistically significant, in contrast to other works 
                                                                          
27. See García Pérez and Sánchez Martín (2008b) for an analysis of the transitions from unemployment for older people. 
Figure 2 Predicted hazard rates according to previous working status 
and age
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where the sector of activity is found to be playing a role [Conde-Ruiz and García (2004), 
Blanco (2000), Villagarcía (1995) and Muñoz (1995)]. 
The next pair of variables try to capture the quality of the labour relations, through the 
consideration of the number of contracts that have been recorded for a given work history 
up to the eligibility moment and the average length of these contracts. 
The results show that job rotation (proxied by the total number of labour relations 
that a person has had) has a negative impact on the retirement hazard, impact that fades 
away as duration increases. The sign of the coefficient suggests that the higher the labour 
rotation the lower the probability of retiring between 60 and 65. This result could be in 
consonance with the findings that workers with a firm-specific training history retire earlier 
than workers with a general training background [Montizaan, Cörvers and de Grip (2007)]. 
On the other hand, the average length of the contract seems to play a significant 
role in the decision to retire only as time unfolds. Although in general, the higher this average 
the more stable the individual’s working life has been, it is not a sophisticated measure of a 
precarious career as the same average may result from quite different job histories. 
5.5 Individual characteristics and other 
The results obtained for the negative role of higher education on the probability of retiring is in 
consonance with what is obtained in most empirical work [Villagarcía (1995) and 
Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006)]28. One explanation of such finding may result from the theory 
that states that low-ability workers are induced to retire early because of the intra-generational 
redistribution built in early retirement provisions via the utility from leisure [Conde-Ruiz 
and Galasso (2003)]. The effect of education is reinforced by duration, so that the lower 
probability of retiring of a higher educated worker is larger the more time it has elapsed since 
becoming eligible. 
As for the health status, the results show a lower hazard for those receiving 
disability benefits the year before. Such counterintuitive finding may just reflect the fact that 
those receiving disability benefits, besides having a poorer health, will probably be the ones 
receiving retirement disability pensions when they turn 65, the only age in which this type of 
pensions can be awarded and which we are not including in our analysis. 
Receiving public transfers other than unemployment or disability benefits reduces 
the retirement probability, which may be a consequence of liquidity constraints. 
Dummy variables for the region (Autonomous Community) where the worker initially 
registered are included in the specifications, as a way to capture other differences in the 
economic environment. Coefficients are not reported but are available under request. 
5.6 Counterfactual Regulation Schemes 
Finally, we have performed a counterfactual exercise with the aim of shedding more light on 
what these magnitudes are likely to mean in reality, by calculating the effect over estimated 
retirement probabilities of small changes in the economic incentive mechanisms underlying 
the Spanish public pension system. The reason for applying only tiny changes to the baseline 
is to avoid the Lucas’ critique, while providing a sensitivity analysis. 
                                                                          
28. Muñoz (1995), on the other hand, finds evidence that the education has a quadratic effect, so that those individuals 
with little or with a lot of studies retire later than those with an intermediate level of education. 
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So we have computed the pension wealth that a person would receive under three 
alternative regulatory schemes, which imply very small changes over the current regulatory 
situation29. We have computed for each individual in the sample the SSW and incentive 
measures that result from the assumed setting. We then have obtained counterfactual 
predicted retirement probabilities so that we can compare them with the one predicted under 
our estimates, which act as a benchmark30. In particular, we compute the changes in relation 
to the population that in the sample are subject to the rules prevailing in 2002. In general 
terms, each of the three alternative regulatory schemes tries to change only one item in the 
pension rules. 
The first counterfactual scenario, setting A, would consist of an overall reduction in 
the amount of the pension perceived at all ages. It caps the pension to 96% of the regulatory 
base, not allowing individuals to get the 100% of it at any retirement age31. Even if no change 
in the number of people retiring is produced, such scenario implies a reduction of the pension 
burden in relation to the benchmark. 
Setting B affects mostly the incentive structure as it requires more years of 
contribution to claim a pension (18 years instead of 15), so that the increase ladder becomes 
stepper. Moreover, at the age of 66, if the person has more than 35 contributory years, an 
additional increase in the amount of the pension is added32. Under this scenario, it cannot be 
initially established whether or not the burden rises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
29. In general terms the current system is characterised by requiring at least 15 years of contribution and with 
the pension being at least 50% of a proxy of gross average lifetime earnings (regulatory base), which raises to 100% 
after 35 or more years of contribution See Appendix 2 on legislation for a detailed description of the system. 
30. The new probabilities are obtained using the specification in column 1 of Table A 2.  
31. Under this scenario, with 15 contributory years the pension amount is only 48% of the regulatory base. Moreover, 
up to 25 years of contribution a 3% increase each year would be added, and from 26, the increase would be 2% 
per year up to 96% of the regulatory base at 35 or more years of contribution. 
32. Under this scenario, there is a 3% increase up to 25 contributory years, while since then the increase is 3.22% 
up to 35. At 66 with more than 35 years of contribution the increase is also 3.22%. Only 2.6% of people at 60 have 
a labour history shorter than 18 years. 
Benchmark Setting A Setting B Setting C
Predicted retirement probability(1) 77.08 76.33 76.82 76.95
Predicted retirement age 62.92 62.93 62.93 62.92
Change in number of retired people(1) - -1.53 -1.58 -0.08
by age:
60 - -1.80 -1.63 0.00
61 - -2.45 -2.09 0.00
62 - -2.48 -2.10 0.00
63 - -2.59 -2.26 0.00
64 - -2.06 -1.90 0.00
65 - -0.60 -1.09 -0.20
(1)In percentage.
(*)The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002.
Setting A: Capping the pension to 96% of the Regulatory Base at 35 years of contribution and to 48% at 15 
years of contribution
Setting B: 18 years of contribution to claim a pension. Retiring after 65 implies 3% increase
Setting C: Retiring after 65 implies 2% increase and 3% if 40 years of contribution
Table 5
Effects of alternative settings on retirement between ages 60 and 65 (*)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0913 
Setting C proposes changes in the short-term incentives to stay beyond 65, 
in the sense that it only introduces higher retirement benefits for each additional year 
beyond 65 that an individual remains not retired33. If effective, it could raise the burden, 
not the implementation year but in the mid and long run. 
Table 5 shows the computed counterfactual predicted retirement probabilities for 
these three scenarios, the average predicted retirement age over the age interval 60-65 
and the changes in the number of retirees in the same interval and its disaggregation by ages. 
All the changes analysed result in an extremely mild increase on the average retirement 
age and a reduction in the number of people who retire between 60 and 65, which goes 
from 0.08% under setting C to 1.6% under setting B. 
We obtain that under the first two scenarios, the retirement rates of all ages are 
affected by the proposed change and that the effects are increasing with age up to 63, when 
the largest impact is recorded. The smallest effect is at 65, reflecting, probably, how this 
age is regarded as normal retirement age. 
The fact that under setting C there is a null impact on the probability of retiring 
between 60 and 64 with respect to the benchmark results from the specification chosen 
to compute the effects, that only reflects the impact of changes in SSA. However, the low 
incidence of the long term incentive (peak value) on the decision results in a very similar figure 
when the specification with the PV variable is chosen, instead. In any case, the decrease in 
the number of people that choose to retire at 65 so as to retire at a later age is rather small 
(0.20 %), as only the incentive changes, but not the social security wealth at that age34. 
                                                                          
33. It reproduces part of the changes introduced by the “Acuerdo sobre Medidas en Materia de Seguridad Social”, 
of 13 July 2006, which were implemented two years later. In particular, at 66 with at least 35 years of contribution a 2% 
increase in the pension is added, raising it to 3% for those individuals with at least 40 years of contribution. 
34. In fact, those whose entire contributory life is below 35 years experience a reduction in the amount they perceive 
at 65 in relation to the benchmark. 
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6 Conclusions 
There is some agreement that early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the 
drop in the labour force participation of elderly workers that had been observed in Spain 
in the nineties. This paper aims at quantifying the impact of these provisions under the 
Spanish Social Security System in the early 2000. 
We have gathered evidence that, in general, the economic incentives stemming 
from Social Security regulations on old age pensions in Spain seem to have the expected 
effect on retirement. We find that the present value of the future flow of pensions has a 
positive impact on the probability of retiring, with larger pensions shortening the span 
between becoming eligible for retirement and actually claiming the retirement pension. 
Therefore, all measures taken to reduce the present value of such flow at early ages may have 
the desired effect of reducing early retirement. 
Moreover, it seems that the built-in incentives in the system not to retire early 
have a non negligible effect on old-age retirement, so that they are effective in retaining 
people. The higher flow of pensions that workers receive for staying at work one additional 
year compensate both the loss of leisure that they experience for the additional year that 
they keep contributing and the wage and salary they perceive at work.  
We also found that the new scheme implemented since 2002 has reduced the 
probability of retiring at each age, in spite of the fact that the substitution effects captured 
through the incentives measures seem to have reduced their incidence on retirement 
decisions. We also found some evidence of a more myopic behaviour of workers as regards 
social security incentives. The changes in the regulation that have taken place may explain 
such results. 
Therefore, our results suggest that, from a policy perspective, reinforcing the 
economic incentives in the system would reduce early retirement. However, any new change 
in the incentive structure of pensions should take into account the longer work histories that 
younger people have, when becoming eligible. In fact, the counterfactual results show that a 
small change in the incentive structure has a small impact on the number of people retiring. 
In particular, it seems that to increase the number of people staying beyond 65 requires more 
than a tiny push. Therefore, a combination of economic incentives with other institutional 
constraints would be necessary to effectively increase the retirement age. 
Finally, as to the impact of these changes on the Social Security accounts, our 
results show that minor changes in the rules that define the amount to perceive at each 
age and in relation to the years effectively contributed may have a positive impact on the 
accounts, through its impact on the probability to retire at each age. However, this might 
not be enough to address the consequences of an ageing population. Thus, from this 
perspective, amendments in retirement rules could be oriented to link the possibility of retiring 
and the benefit rights not only to contributive efforts to, but also to life expectancy. 
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APPENDIX 1 
DATA 
This appendix contains the definition of the variables included in the different specifications. 
As it has already been mentioned in the text, the main data source is the Muestra Continua 
de Vidas Laborales 2006 (MCVL 2006), a sample of administrative data gathered by the 
Social Security Department. 
The subsample used includes the available information on men who have 
contributed to social security at least once in their lifetime, have not collected an old age 
pension before 1997, and who were born between 1936 and 1946, so that in 2006 they were 
between 60 and 70 years old. Moreover, we restrict it to those men whose longest 
contributory relationship with the Social Security took place in the General Regime, the 
scheme that covers most workers and whose description can be found in the following 
appendix on legislation. We also drop those individuals who have collected an old pension 
after 1997, but whose eligibility to access a retirement pension, in terms of having at 
least fifteen contributory years, could not be proved with the available data, as a pension 
could not be estimated for them35. The final subsample is composed of 35,853 individuals. 
The main statistics for each variable is presented in Table A1. 
Economic Incentive Variables 
To calculate the Social Security benefits to which individuals in our sample are entitled, 
we make use of the Social Security covered earnings histories of individual in the MCVL 2006. 
SSWit  :  Value of Social Security Wealth of individual i at time t, at 2006 prices: 
]])/()t|s(p)[r,s(B[)r(SSW tsi
Ls
ts
iiit





	


 1 , 
indicates Social Security Wealth at time t (at age t) if retiring at age r, L is the maximum life 
length, ),( rsBi is the pension benefit in period s (at age s) if retiring at r, p(s | r) is 
the conditional probability of an individual at time t to be alive at time s where s>r, i  is the 
individual discount rate. 
To calculate the pension we make use of data on covered earnings and from it 
we have built the Regulatory Base which has been computed as the regulation establishes. 
The minimum base that has been used to complete job careers has been the one
corresponding to contributory group 5, senior administrative (“oficial administrativo”), 
the group with the largest volume of population. On the other hand, the maximum base has 
been taken to be the one corresponding to group 1, Engineers and Graduates (“Ingenieros y 
Licenciados”), the group with the highest base for all the years. The maximum life 
length (L) has been taken to be 98 years; i , the individual discount rate is assumed to be 
fixed at 3%, p(s| r), the conditional probability of an individual aged r to be alive at age s, 
has been taken from the National Statistics Institute (INE) demographic projections 
scenario 2, based upon 2001 Census data and pensions are assumed to increase 2% yearly 
                                                                          
35. The administrative nature of the data source explains that a limited number of individuals had to be deleted from the 
sample as the available information for them did not seem consistent. 
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from 2006. Minimum and maximum pensions are applied and the minimum one corresponds 
to a worker with a dependent spouse. 
In order to calculate the different incentive measures, we need to project SSW for the 
future. Two different situations arise, depending on the age of the individual and whether or 
not he has retired. For those that are not 66 before 2006, we need to project their pension 
and their SSW beyond this year. To do so, we assume that their salary and, therefore, their 
contributory base will be increasing at a 2% rate every year.  For those that have retired 
before 2006, we project their salaries for the years before 2006 assuming that they keep the 
purchasing power of their last observed salary (or the following one), so that the contributory 
base increases by the same amount as the December over December CPI36. 
SSAit  : The accrual rate, 
ititiit )r(SSW)1r(SSW)1/(1)r(SSA 		
  
and we let 
)(
)r(SSW)r(SSW
t
it
it
	
	

	
	
1
11 1  
A limitation of this index is that it does not take into account the comparison that 
the individual can make between pension benefits and the level of his/her income. It could be 
argued that the leisure preference is such that wages can fully compensate for the forgone 
leisure enjoyment from postponing retirement. 
PVit : Peak Value computed between the ages of 60 and 65 is defined as, 
 
where 
 
We follow Coile and Gruber (2000) and restrict the peak value to be equal to the 
accrual rate, if the individual works beyond the highest value for his social security wealth37. 
RRit : Replacement rate, )r(RRi  is the ratio of the expected pension benefits )r(Bi  
at time t over wages )r(wi  perceived at time t-1 for individual i at age r, if the person 
retires at age r. 
                                                                          
36. Alternatively, we could have taken the average increase in observed national accounts data for compensation 
of employees.  
37. They also normalize the peak value by the expected stream of wages over the period between the maximum year 
and the current year. Hence their actual index measures the benefits of continued work relative to the social security 
wealth earnings in the same period. They call this measure the tax/subsidy rate. This normalization can also be made to 
the accrual measure. 
otherwiseSSA
rSSWrrSSWrrrSSWrrSSWrPV
i
iiiii
,
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))r(w/)r(B(E)r(RR iiri 
  
where E is the expectation operator. 
Other variables 
failurejubiit  : dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person retires at time t and 0 
otherwise. It is the dependent variable. 
disabit-1  : Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving any 
disability benefit while he was a year younger (at time t-1) and zero, otherwise. 
univi : dummy variable that takes value 1 if the contributory group (“grupo de 
cotización”) of the longest contributory relationship with the Social Security system is the one 
with the highest academic qualifications (group 1: “Engineers and Graduates”), and zero, 
otherwise. 
numreli  : number of contributory labour relations that have been recorded by the 
Social Security before becoming entitled to an old age pension and that include those 
involving the perception of unemployment benefits. 
Regional Government (Comunidad Autónoma) where the worker initially 
registered: Group of 19 dummy variables, each one corresponding to a CA, plus one for 
Ceuta and one for Melilla, that records the initial worker’s registration. (IIccaa-) 
servi  : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the longest job a person has held has 
taken place in the following CNAE sector classifications: Trade (50 to 52), Restoration 
(Hostelería) (55), Transport (60 to 64), other services, including education y health (65 to 67, 
70 to 74,  80, 85 and 90). 
uit-1 : Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving 
unemployment benefits38, either as a subsidy or a contributory transfer, while he was a year 
younger (at time t-1), and zero, otherwise. 
lit-1 : Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was working and 
contributing to Social Security while he was a year younger (at time t-1), and value zero, 
otherwise. 
g_kit  : Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is at time t in the k–th period 
decision and cero otherwise, where k=[1,6]. That is, g_k takes value 1 if the value of the 
length of the spell from the year the person becomes entitled to a retirement pension is k. 
age_kit  : Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is k years old at time t and 
cero otherwise, where k=[60,65]. 
cyclet  : Spanish GDP real growth rate (for years 1997 to 2006). 
                                                                          
38. It corresponds to the people whose relationship with Social Security is coded as a TRL 751-756 in the administrative 
files.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0913 
r2002: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of the observation is greater 
than 2001. 
otherbenit-1  : Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving 
any Social Security benefit other than disability, old age or unemployment while he was a year 
younger (at time t-1) and zero, otherwise. 
meanlengthI  : average number of years per spell that the individual i has had before 
becoming entitled to a pension. 
t: trend variable. 
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APPENDIX 2  
LEGISLATION 
The institutional framework 
The labour-market based social security is mandatory for workers in Spain. Old-age public 
pensions are mainly provided through three different schemes: General Social Security 
scheme [Régimen General de la Seguridad Social (RGSS)], Special Social Security Regimes 
[Regímenes Especiales de la Seguridad Social (RESS)] and government employees scheme 
[Régimen de Clases Pasivas (RCP)]39. Around 72% of social security contributions are 
obtained from the RGSS. The pension regulations for RESS, within which the self-employed 
are assigned, and RCP do not, in general, allow for early retirement, so that the focus of 
the analysis will be on the RGSS. 
The main changes that have taken place in Social Security regulation in recent years 
that affect the period covered by the sample correspond to the reforms introduced in 1997 
and 2002 in relation to the framework set in 1985.40  
The normal retirement age in Spain, that is the age when a person becomes eligible 
for the full pension benefit, is 65. In fact, in some sectors retirement at sixty-five has been 
compulsory for some years. However, since 2002, incentives have been built in the regulation 
so as to promote retirement beyond the age of 6541. Early retirement is possible from the age 
of 60, under some strict conditions that are detailed below and that imply a reduction in the 
amount of the pension to be perceived that is defined by a reduction coefficient. 
Entitlement criteria for RGSS 
A payroll tax defined for both employers and employees and levied on earnings, with a 
minimum contribution and a maximum pensionable earning, finances the Social Security 
System. 
Up to 1997 only 8 contributory years were required to be entitled to a retirement 
pension. The change introduced in 1997 set a timetable to extend this period to fifteen years, 
one every year, so that in 2002, 15 years were required to be able to receive a pension at the 
age of 65, the ordinary retirement age. An additional requirement introduced in 1997 was 
that two of these contributed years had to have taken place during the last eight years.  
As for early retirement before the age of 65 there are three different cases42: 
                                                                          
39. The RGSS and RESS are administered and managed by the Social Security as a joint pay-as-you-go system. 
The RCP is administered and managed by the Central Government. 
40. In particular, up to 2002, pension regulations required total or substantial withdrawal from any form of 
employment requiring affiliation to the Social Security System to be able to perceive an old-age pension. In 2002, partial 
retirement was regulated, so that employment and old-age pensions could be simultaneously enjoyed, while the 
mandatory retirement age at 65 was effectively abolished. In 2006 a new agreement among government, trade unions 
and employers’ associations was reached, but with limited impact. Ley 40/2007, de 4 de diciembre, de medidas en 
materia de Seguridad Social. 
41. The regulation increased the amount of the pension to be received if the worker remained employed while the 
payment of social contributions by employers and employees with indefinite-term contacts were waived. 
42. Regulation also allows for early retirement for special professions, especially those involving dangerous or unhealthy 
activities or some instances of those affected by industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation. Moreover, as it 
has already been mentioned, a new regulation came into force in 2002 allowing for partial retirement that can be 
simultaneously enjoyed with a part-time job. Workers can partially retire starting at the age of 60 if the firm replaces the 
retiree with another worker (relief contract) to compensate for the retiree’s reduction in work-time. 
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On the one hand, those who, before January 1, 1967, contributed to the labour 
mutual funds system that preceded the current Social Security system are entitled to retire 
from the age of 60 if the total contributory years are at least 15. 
For those whose initial contribution year dates from after 1967 and only since 
the 2002 amendment, the earliest retirement age is 61. For them, the minimum number of 
contributory years amounts to 30. Moreover, in order to be able to claim the pension, 
they have to have spent at least six months involuntarily unemployed and registered 
as job seekers in the Public Employment Service Offices, immediately preceding the claim. 
Years spent unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits add as contributory years 
towards an old-age pension43. 
Retiring at the age of 64 is also possible and is subject to different rules: from 2002 
no previous period of unemployment is required, but just the minimum 15 contributory 
years. However, in this case, the firm needs to hire another worker for a minimum period 
of a year (substitution contract) to replace the retiree, if full benefits (as at the age of 65) are to 
be guaranteed. 
The database does not provide information about contributions dating from before 
the seventies. On the other hand, all men born between 1936 and 1946 could potentially 
have been working by 1967, as the youngest would have started working at the age of 21. 
Therefore, the assumption in the empirical part is that all people in the sample contributed 
to the labour mutual funds system, so that they only require 15 years of contribution to be 
entitled to retire44. In fact, in our sample 34% of those we observe retiring, do so at 60 years 
of age. 
The pension amount 
The actual level of the old age pension is defined by the interaction of different elements. 
On the one hand, the Regulatory Base (Base reguladora, BR) that defines the amount upon 
which to calculate the pension rights is directly related to wages perceived, but subject 
to lower and upper caps45. The minimum and maximum contributory periods to be included 
in its calculation and the inflation correction to obtain its present value are regulatory defined. 
Reduction coefficients for early retirement and for less than 35 years of contribution are also 
defined46. Minimum and maximum pensions are yearly defined and depend on marital status 
and number of dependents of the person receiving the benefit. Pensions are indexed by the 
Consumer Price Index. Up to 2002, any additional year contributed beyond 35 did not add to 
the amount of pension received. 
A person retiring between 1985 and 1996 with at least 15 contributory years at year t 
had a regulatory base defined as: 
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43. In fact, unemployed workers aged 52 and older can receive unemployment benefits that turn into subsidies until they 
are eligible for early or ordinary retirement. 
44. We also find that 40% of people in the sample who retire do so with less than 30 registered years of contribution.
45. Different caps have been in place for different types of workers depending on their group of contribution (grupo de 
cotización) associated with the type of job and education level. 
46. As it has already been mentioned, there is a special treatment for those that contributed to the system before 1967 
(mutual funds contributors or “mutualistas”). 
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where  wt-j are covered earnings for the jth month before retiring at t and I t-j is the price 
index for the jth month before retirement47, so that only eight years are taken into account 
to define BR. 
Since 2002, the contributory base is defined as: 
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so that 15 years are taken into account. A transitory period was set from 1997 to 2002 so 
that a one year increase in the years considered in the indexed part of the weighted average 
was included per year, so that in 2002 the fifteen years were finally accounted for48. 
The relation between the first monthly pension received at time t (Bt) and the 
regulatory base (BRt) calculated at t can be expressed as: 
 
t
T
ntt BRB 
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 , so that 
y
nt  depends only on contributory years (n), and 
a
nt  depends 
on the age of retirement. If retirement age is equal or larger than 65 then, and up to 1997, 
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The reform introduced in 1997 modified the number of years to define the 
contributory base and the substitution rate (Tn) if age of retirement was equal or larger 
than 65, so that: 
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The new scheme thus implies a more progressive approach to full benefits. 
For early retirement, regulation also sets a penalization system linked to age. 
Mutualistas that retire early are subject to a reduction coefficient equivalent to 8% for 
each year in advance of 65 that he/she retires, so that    60650801 

 rwherer.at . 
The 1997 reform reduced the reduction coefficient to 7% for those with more than 40 
                                                                          
47. It is divided by 112 as pensions are paid in fourteen annual instalments. 
48. As social contributions are paid 14 months a year, the effective number of years taken into account to compute the 
regulatory base is 6.8 up to 1997 and 12.9 since then. The 2006 agreement proposes to rise the effective contributory 
years to 15, without taking into account the 14 monthly payments.  
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contributory years, when claiming the pension. This coefficient should be jointly applied with 
the one corresponding to contributory years. 
The 2002 reform changed the penalization mechanism, so as to make the age 
coefficient ( at ) more linked to the number of contributed years, so that: 
 
 
 
where r is retirement age. 
Moreover, it introduced a premium for late retirement, so that the pension was 
increased by 2% per additional year if the worker credited more than 35 years of 
contribution49: 
  3565650201 	
 n and r if  r.Tn  
 
 
 
                                                                          
49. The 2006 agreement proposed raising the premium to 3% for those with more than 40 contributory years. The 
partial retirement regulation introduced with the 2002 reform, established that no correction coefficient for age would 
be used for those claiming this type of pension. The reform agreed in 2006 aims at rationalizing this type of retirement, 
requiring six years of seniority in the firm before retiring, 30 contributory years (instead of the current 15), and changing 
the maximum and minimum labour day reduction to 75% and 25%, respectively from the current 85% to 15%. 
Full implementation will be in four years time.
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median mean s.d. median mean s.d. median mean s.d.
SSWt
(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAt
(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVt(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRt
(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lt-1
(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
ut-1(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
numrel 10.770 25.866 9.547 19.763 11.420 28.565
meanlenght(3) 7.237 7.243 7.763 7.436 6.957 7.122
time since eligible(3) 2.677 1.565 2.275 1.390 2.892 1.609
univ 0.106 0.307 0.101 0.302 0.108 0.310
serv 0.364 0.481 0.356 0.479 0.367 0.482
disab 0.126 0.332 0.024 0.152 0.181 0.385
otherben 0.134 0.341 0.030 0.172 0.190 0.392
low60 0.086 0.281 0.101 0.302 0.078 0.268
low61 0.047 0.211 0.034 0.181 0.053 0.224
low62 0.029 0.168 0.015 0.123 0.036 0.187
low63 0.018 0.134 0.008 0.091 0.024 0.152
low64 0.011 0.104 0.005 0.067 0.014 0.120
low65 0.008 0.086 0.003 0.053 0.010 0.100
top64 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.042
top65 0.003 0.058 0.001 0.034 0.005 0.067
age61 0.219 0.413 0.236 0.425 0.209 0.407
age62 0.175 0.380 0.158 0.365 0.184 0.387
age63 0.135 0.342 0.110 0.313 0.148 0.355
age64 0.100 0.300 0.068 0.252 0.118 0.322
age65 0.065 0.246 0.027 0.162 0.085 0.278
cycle(4) 3.667 0.679 4.262 0.688 3.350 0.406
r2002 0.653 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
   (1) In thousands of euros
   (3)In years
   (4) In percentage variation of GDP
After 2002
   (2) In percentage
Table A 1
Descriptive values. Sample of
men born between 1936 and 1946, having worked in the General Regimen, with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
All period considered 
1996-2006 Before 2002 
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ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
LR chi2(45)=38014.62 LR chi2(49)=38187.03 LR chi2(56)=38597.09 LR chi2(45)=38030.83 LR chi2(49)=38213.54 LR chi2(56)=38607.93
Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371 Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371
Log likelihood =  -33064.09 Log likelihood = -32977.89 Log likelihood =  -32772.86 Log likelihood = -33055.97 Log likelihood = -32964.63 Log likelihood = -32767.44
SSWt 2.979 2.969 2.462 2.401 2.322 2.289
(23.08)*** (23.31)*** (11.69)*** (11.81)*** (10.78)*** (10.83)***
SSAt -7.993 -12.941 -10.510
(-7.07)*** (-7.78)*** (-5.69)***
PVt -4.284 -6.730 -5.363
(-8.11)*** (-9.26)*** (-6.92)***
RRt 0.046 0.043 -0.083 -0.144 -0.085 -0.139
(1.2) (1.14) (-1.25) (-2.14)* (-1.28) (-2.06)*
SSWt * r2002 1.109 1.166 1.272 1.252
(4.76)*** (5.16)*** (5.48)*** (5.53)***
SSAt * r2002 8.821 4.018
(4.50)*** (2.04)*
PVt * r2002 4.451 3.265
(4.94)*** (3.61)***
RRt * r2002 0.232 0.300 0.151 0.252
(3.04)** (3.89)*** (1.97)* (3.26)**
 r2002 -0.763 -0.843 -0.689 -0.787
(-10.37)*** (-11.04)*** (-9.31)*** (-10.24)***
low60 0.205 0.224
(4.45)*** (5.01)***
low61 -0.035 -0.001
(-0.46) (-0.01)
low62 -0.587 -0.554
(-5.68)*** (-5.38)***
low63 -0.922 -0.878
(-6.42)*** (-6.14)***
low64 -1.885 -1.899
(-9.73)*** (-9.80)***
top64 -0.546 -0.383
(-2.26)* (-1.61)
top65 -1.509 -1.415
(-11.52)*** (-11.07)***
l t-1 -1.577 -1.577 -1.551 -1.556 -1.575 -1.577
(-39.51)*** (-39.52)*** (-38.65)*** (-38.77)*** (-39.05)*** (-39.10)***
u t-1 0.942 0.934 0.965 0.952 0.954 0.947
(25.21)*** (24.98)*** (25.72)*** (25.33)*** (25.31)*** (25.09)***
numrel -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.023
(-11.82)*** (-11.74)*** (-11.11)*** (-11.06)*** (-11.74)*** (-11.66)***
t x numrel 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(9.03)*** (8.97)*** (8.68)*** (8.65)*** (9.10)*** (9.04)***
meanlenght 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.75) (0.73) (0.96) (1.01) (1.57) (1.58)
t x meanlenght 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(3.85)*** (3.92)*** (3.43)*** (3.40)*** (2.56)* (2.61)**
serv -0.003 -0.001 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.024
(-0.07) (-0.02) (0.50) (0.54) (0.58) (0.60)
t x serv -0.020 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028
(-1.67) (-1.81)* (-2.01)* (-2.13)* (-2.22)* (-2.30)*
(cont…)
 MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C
Table A 2
Logit estimates of the effects of pension incentives on retirement behaviour between 60 and 65 years of age. Males born between 1936 and 1946, 
having worked in the General Regime with a relation with the Social Security in 2006(*)
115.532 number of observations
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND REGULATION
WORKING STATUS, SECTOR OF ACTIVITY AND OTHER LABOUR HISTORY RELATED VARIABLES
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(cont…)
univ -0.729 -0.751 -0.706 -0.716 -0.779 -0.794
(-10.46)*** (-10.82)*** (-10.10)*** (-10.28)*** (-10.95)*** (-11.18)***
t x univ -0.078 -0.068 -0.086 -0.079 -0.038 -0.029
(-4.02)*** (-3.57)*** (-4.39)*** (-4.15)*** (-1.89) (-1.49)
disab -1.578 -1.586 -1.468 -1.485 -1.484 -1.498
(-8.28)*** (-8.34)*** (-7.64)*** (-7.74)*** (-7.70)*** (-7.78)***
otherben -2.981 -2.970 -2.978 -2.972 -3.016 -3.015
(-17.55)*** (-17.54)*** (-17.39)*** (-17.41)*** (-17.54)*** (-17.55)***
age61 -0.015 -0.037 -0.069 -0.095 0.098 0.069
(-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.29) (-0.40) (0.40) (0.28)
age62 -1.047 -1.076 -1.055 -1.087 -0.767 -0.791
(-3.70)*** (-3.80)*** (-3.70)*** (3.81)*** (-2.48)* (-2.56)*
age63 -0.710 -0.739 -0.725 -0.759 -0.098 -0.134
(-2.50)* (-2.59)** (-2.54)* (-2.65)** (-0.32) (-0.44)
age64 -0.712 -0.759 -0.686 -0.739 0.247 0.213
(-2.46)* (-2.63)** (-2.36)* (-2.55)* (0.78) (0.67)
age65 2.813 2.788 2.865 2.834 3.271 3.272
(10.94)*** (10.84)*** (11.09)*** (10.96)*** (12.34)*** (12.33)***
cycle 0.241 0.246 0.111 0.119 0.125 0.131
(16.89)*** (17.18)*** (5.94)*** (6.42)*** (6.69)*** (7.03)***
g1 -0.514 -0.540 -0.591 -0.615 -0.331 -0.370
(-1.96 (-2.06)* (-2.24)* (-2.33)* (-1.23) (-1.37)
g2 -1.703 -1.733 -1.697 -1.723 -1.539 -1.572
(-6.76)*** (-6.88)*** (-6.74*** (-64.85)*** (-6.02)*** (-6.15)***
g3 -0.522 -0.557 -0.538 -0.567 -0.442 -0.483
(-2.06)* (-2.20)* (-2.11)* (-2.22)* (-1.64) (-1.79)
g4 -0.858 -0.904 -0.856 -0.891 -1.094 -1.128
(-3.52)*** (-3.72)*** (-3.50)*** (-3.65)*** (-4.32)*** (-4.45)***
g5 0.054 0.027 0.028 0.016 -0.494 -0.519
(0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (-1.95) (-2.05)*
cons -2.328 -2.264 -1.422 -1.306 -1.731 -1.635
(-3.82)*** (-3.71)*** (-2.30)* (-2.12)* (-2.76)** (-24602)**
  Statistical significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Coefficients of Autonomous Communities not resported. Prob > chi2=0.
 DURATION VARIABLES
(*) Notes:
  Model A represents the basic model. Model B includes Model A and changes in 2002 regulation as control variables. Model C includes Model B and income levels as control variables.
   Dependent variable is 1 if person retires and 0 otherwise, conditioned on not having retired before. Monetary values are in 1,000,000 euros, prices 2006. Z-values are in parenthesis.
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mean median mean median mean median mean median
Economic Incentives and 
Regulation
SSWt 0.71796 0.3355 0.71724 0.3356 0.72477 0.3316 0.71524 0.3285
SSAt -0.03813 -0.0150 -0.05987 -0.0232
PVt -0.03802 -0.0129 -0.03497 -0.0121
RRt 0.08219 0.0336 0.08559 0.0351 0.03570 0.0147 0.06126 0.0252
r2002 overall change -2.25680 -0.9702 -2.22498 -0.9991 -1.92871 -0.8550 -1.95254 -0.8653
r2002 change
low60 1.62710 0.8772 1.78145 0.9653
low61 -0.26814 -0.1388 -0.00481 -0.0025
low62 -4.06336 -1.8863 -3.86059 -1.8065
low64 -10.06721 -3.8245 -10.12212 -3.8505
top64 -3.79020 -1.7773 -2.74440 -1.3249
top65 -8.60682 -3.4529 -8.23754 -3.3657
Individual Characteristics
numrel -0.06679 -0.0140 -0.06649 -0.0139 -0.07140 -0.0150 -0.07098 -0.0149
lt-1 -12.35680 -10.8762 -12.39243 -10.8844 -12.52456 -10.9361 -12.55584 -10.9680
ut-1 7.88561 5.8823 7.76664 5.7665 7.75133 5.6599 7.69776 5.6092
uni -5.48050 -2.6384 -5.49809 -2.6548 -5.59620 -2.6804 -5.63769 -2.7072
serv -0.03528 -0.0184 -0.03166 -0.0165 -0.03040 -0.0160 -0.03175 -0.0167
disab -8.74993 -3.4459 -8.82212 -3.4737 -8.76336 -3.4515 -8.82900 -3.4802
otherben -13.93090 -5.0912 -13.91856 -5.1202 -13.91094 -5.0656 -13.91999 -5.0940
NOTES:
Results are obtained under Models B and C in Table A2. The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002.
Quantitative effects of the continuous variables are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10% increase 
in the variables' values with respect to the logistic function evaluated at the observed variables' values.
Table A 4
Quantitative effects of pension incentives and other variables on the average hazard rate for ages between 
60 and 65
MODEL B MODEL C
ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
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